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Abstract 
The development of a new policy instrument, “emissions trading”, is analysed as an innova-
tion journey in the realm of governance. Tracking the process by which a novel pattern of 
social regulation emerges and travels shows how “policy technology” develops according to 
dynamics of its own, partly independent of policy problems and goals. Interactions across 
science, policy development and particular domains of governance are critical for the transi-
tion between phases: from options to first developments, to experimentation with a prototype 
and to further diffusion and the formation of a new policy regime. Key factors are the use of 
openings in existing governance regimes, establishment of linkages with contexts of imple-
mentation and the generation of momentum through the “carbon industry” as an emerging 
service economy.  
1  Introduction 
In a broad sense, governance can be understood as de-facto existing patterns of regulation 
within a particular domain of societal interaction. To a large extent such patterns are rooted in 
institutions which emerge more or less unintentionally from interactions in economic and so-
cial life (Giddens, 1986/1984; Burns, Dietz, 1995; Greshoff et al., 2003). But there are also 
marked influences of design. Public policy is, among others, concerned with the (re-
)configuration of institutions with a view to bring about desired outcomes of interaction. The 
particular techniques that are applied for this purpose are referred to as policy instruments: 
particular institutional designs which shall serve to steer social interaction into desired direc-
tions, often based on some kind of scientific model of underlying social dynamics. The gov-
ernance of modern societies is to a considerable degree influenced and shaped by policy in-
struments. Hardly any realm of social interaction is left untouched by attempts at purposeful 
institutional reconfiguration with the purpose of steering society into certain desired direc-
tions. Understanding how innovation in governance happens, how new configurations emerge 
and how patterns of regulation transform, therefore suggests a closer look at the development 
and introduction of new policy instruments. 
In contrast to the bulk of policy studies which analyse policy change as starting from shifting 
problem definitions and policy goals I here put the means of policy—or the techniques of 
governance—at centre stage. This perspective assumes that policy instruments have a life of 
their own, partly independent of problems and goals, which is worth investigating.
1  
This article uses the concept of the “innovation journey” to track the process by which new 
policy instruments come into being. The notion was introduced by Van de Ven et al (1999) as 
a loose concept to grasp the open ended nature of organisational innovation. Rip and Schot 
(1999; 2001) have proposed an elaborated and extended version for the analysis of socio-   
technical innovation in a broader societal context.
2 They conceptualise science, technology 
and the market as three poles between which innovation networks can be mapped and specify 
patterns for particular phases in the innovation journey. Typical phases are the emergence of 
new options, delivery of proof-of-principle through early developments in a protected space, 
stepping out into real world application contexts by experiments with a prototype, and wider 
introduction and diffusion which may lead into the formation of a new technological regime. I 
build on this elaborated concept of innovation journey and explore in how far it can be trans-
ferred to the study of policy instruments as innovations in governance.  
In this article I present the results of applying the concept to emissions trading, a new policy 
instrument whose emergence impacted considerably on environmental governance regimes 
throughout the world. Emissions trading already attracted attention as a remarkable case of 
policy innovation in its early days when it was merely a policy proposal by the US Environ-
mental Protection Agency to introduce some flexibility into command-and-control regulation 
under the US Clean Air Act. A close observer at that time noted that “…remarkably few re-
form proposals (…) have successfully negotiated the perilous path from concept to implemen-
tation. Certainly this is not due to any shortage of ideas on how existing regulations or the 
regulatory process could be improved (…). Even if only a fraction of the proposals were to 
prove meritorious, the number of implemented reforms would be insignificant compared with 
the number of ideas. The paucity of implemented reforms suggests that there may be much to 
learn from those that did become policy. One leading example is the emissions trading pro-
gram” (Tietenberg, 1985:2). Today, about twenty years later, emissions trading has become 
something like a global standard in environmental governance. With a view to the fundamen-
tal changes in concepts, institutions and practices of environmental policy (as compared to the 
formerly predominant mode of command-and-control regulation) emissions trading appears 
as not only a successful, but also a radical innovation in governance.
3 
Does the success of emissions trading signify natural progress in the development of govern-
ance through learning on the side of policy-makers? Did emissions trading break through be-
cause it proved to be the better instrument in fulfilling environmental policy goals? Literature 
on policy instrument choice would suggest this sort of explanation (Hall 1993; Howlett, 
Ramesh 1993; Jenkins-Smith, Sabatier, 1993; Rose, 1993). A side glance at the innovation 
studies literature, however, gives rise to some scepticism. For technological and organisa-
tional change it has been often noted that innovations are not always successful, because they 
are in any objective sense better, but that innovation processes are full of complexities and 
ironies. Successful innovations may be the result of  the influence of powerful constituencies 
or contingent context conditions and path-dependencies (Nelson, Winter, 1982; David 1985; 
Dosi, 1988; Rip, Kemp, 1998; Van de Ven et al., 1999; Garud, Karnøe, 2001). This raises 
questions about how emissions trading actually became what it is. What made emissions trad-
ing successful? How did it become established in the context of pre-existing governance re-
gimes? What were the origins, what was the course, what were phases of its innovation jour-
ney? Which factors and mechanisms shaped its dynamics?  
I follow up on these questions by briefly setting out how the concept of innovation journey 
can be applied to policy instruments as a particular type of innovations in governance. Then I 
present a case study which reconstructs how emissions trading as a policy instrument un-
folded, became embedded in existing governance contexts and gained momentum. In a sepa-
rate section I highlight the emergence of regimes of policy technology as a relevant dimension 
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of governance dynamics. In conclusion I discuss the value added by introducing an innovation 
perspective to the study of governance. 
2  Innovation journeys in governance 
When using the concept of an innovation journey to study the life of policy instruments, I am 
actually looking at a case of innovation in governance (Voß, 2005). A brief excursion is nec-
essary to indicate what an innovation journey in the realm of governance will look like, and 
how it is visible for emissions trading. 
I use a broad notion of governance which comprises the totality of de-facto existing rule pat-
terns which regulate interaction within a certain social domain like a nation state, a sector or a 
company. These rule patterns stabilise practices. They comprise codified and non-codified 
rules of behaviour as well as ideas and discourse patterns which influence actors’ perceptions, 
also material technologies which shape the space of interaction. This broad notion of govern-
ance is not restricted to particular mechanisms or types of governance such as negotiation in 
networks (as opposed to hierarchical government). Instead, it comprises different types of 
governance patterns (and combinations of them). Hierarchical government can be one of 
them, such as regulation through the competitive forces of the market, guidance through 
dominant expectations, the channelling of perceptions through paradigms, or inducement of 
actions by technological functions.
 4 Such de-facto existing conglomerate governance patterns 
are partly designed, partly emergent (Czada, Schimank, 2000; Rip, Groen, 2002). Against the 
background of such a broad notion of governance, political action can in a generic sense be 
understood as the intervention in de-facto governance with the aim to reconfigure patterns of 
interaction and by this way influence outcomes (cf. Héritier et al., 1998:11-13).
5 
Innovation in governance is here understood as the development of new configurations that 
work for shaping social interaction patterns and outcomes. This includes their introduction 
into existing governance structures. Innovation differs from change in that it is intentionally 
brought forward by actors with the aim to alter and control societal interaction (although out-
comes maybe transintentional, cf. Greshoff et al., 2003; Voß et al., 2006).
6  
In this perspective, the development of policy instruments is a special case of innovation in 
governance, one which deals with the introduction of specific techniques for the intervention 
in de-facto governance with the aim of shaping interaction patterns and outcomes. Such tech-
niques comprise the arrangement of heterogeneous elements, not only rules in the narrow 
sense of laws or administrative orderings. They comprise orientating symbols and value 
frames, theoretical models and narratives of interaction and outcomes, problem and goal defi-
nitions, specifications of functional mechanisms, expectations about the outcome of their 
working, legal rules, informal norms, adapted operational routines on the side of regulating 
agents as well as on the side of addressed societal actors, skills, financial resources, organisa-
tional capacities, technological artefacts, politically influential actors as sponsors etc. Innovat-
ing policy instruments involves the formation and stabilisation of such hybrid configurations 
and their embedding in contexts of use, i.e. in pre-structured interaction contexts of the real 
world where specific governance patterns are already in place.  
In this sense, policy instruments can be linked with broad notions of technology as “configu-
rations that work” (Rip, Kemp, 1998). They involve the engineering of hybrid networks of 
elements so that they play together in a way to produce an expected outcome. Configurations 
that work extend far beyond textbook designs. They involve user practices, maintenance, 
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regulation, financing, infrastructure, public acceptance etc. Due to the complex interplay of 
these heterogeneous elements much can go wrong in development and implementation. Com-
promises, unintended effects, repair work, setbacks, shifts in function, design and goals, and 
unwanted impacts are essential features of the innovation process. Irony is as common in the 
innovation of policy instruments as with other types of technology (Rip, 2006). 
Rip/Schot develop the innovation journey concept with respect to examples from telephony, 
superconductors, pharmaceuticals, computers, aircraft, electric vehicles, polymers, biotech-
nology and multi-media. Although this is a broad and diverse field of technology, it centres 
on material technologies which are produced and used in a commercial environment. Their 
innovation journey concept thus needs some adaptation for policy instruments. They map the 
hybrid networks in which innovation occurs on a simplified differentiation of the poles of 
science, technology and regulation-market-society.
7  For the analysis of policy instruments as 
innovation in governance this scheme is turned into a map that stretches out between the poles 
of science, policy development and governance domain. Relevant areas of science include 
economics, law and the social sciences. Policy development comprises professional policy 
analysis and consulting, including provision of legal, financial and technical services. The 
governance domain is the field of de-facto governance including established practices of po-
litical intervention to which the instrument shall be applied.  
Continuing to use concepts and terminology from innovation studies, one can distinguish 
typical phases in the innovation journey: A phase of gestation brings up precursors in form of 
new options, variations in practice, emerging pressures on existing governance regimes, but 
without the linkages that make up a new configuration. A first critical stage shows develop-
ments towards linking-up various elements into a new configuration that could work. These 
developments take place in a protected space, shielded from immediate pressures of the po-
litical selection environment. If they are successful they establish a “proof of principle” that a 
new mechanism might work. Partly overlapping with this phase, the next phase develops a 
prototype and demonstrators as exemplars of a new policy instrument with articulated func-
tional principles. With these, steps are taken out of the protected space and into real world 
governance contexts. First experiments with implementation occur when niches appear that 
represent an amenable local selection environment within the overarching context of estab-
lished governance regimes. Learning and embedding takes place within these niches with 
communities of practice that share special experiences and skills. After proof of principle and 
prototype a third phase begins, if the instrument branches off from its niches into new open-
ings within governance regimes. If experiences, skills, legitimisation, resources, social sup-
port from various implementation sites can be linked up with each other and cumulated, the 
innovation develops further momentum and may stretch or crack established regime struc-
tures of governance thus creating further space for expansion and diffusion. Enlarged scope 
and broader diffusion of the instrument entail differentiation of special skills, professions and 
organisations which link-up with policy developments and provide services such as legal ad-
vice, financing, training. Following this phase of expansion and diffusion local communities 
of practice become arched over by structures provide organisational capacities and technolo-
gies to support implementation, evaluation and maintenance to guard and retain the instru-
ment. Benchmarks, standards and certification schemes come up. At this stage one can speak 
of the formation of a regime around the new instrument, a regime of policy technology that 
cuts across governance domains. Technological regimes have their own dynamics which may 
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interfere with the policy process, enable and restrict policy strategies, and become part of the 
dynamics of governance change. 
These phases of an innovation journey are clearly visible in the case of emissions trading. In 
the following section I will use them to structure the case study on the development and intro-
duction of the policy instrument. Emissions trading is a new instrument for environmental 
policy. It addresses the need to regulate the release of harmful gases into the atmosphere by 
making use of the market mechanism to regulate emissions across a population of installa-
tions.
8 The basic concept is to define a total amount of emissions by all sources which shall be 
subject to regulation (usually an entire sector of the economy), issue allowances for a propor-
tionate amount of this total, and let these be traded freely among those actors who wish to 
produce corresponding amounts of emissions. According to economic theory this will lead to 
the optimal allocation of emissions: Those who are willing to pay most for the allowance are 
the ones who face the highest costs of reducing emissions. Other ones who have cheap oppor-
tunities for emission reductions will prefer to exploit them rather than buying permits. Emis-
sions trading thus promises that whatever level of emission control is politically required, it 
can be achieved in the most efficient way, at minimal cost to society. Or, the other way round, 
each dollar spent on emission control produces the highest possible effect for the environment 
(Baron, Philibert, 2005; Tietenberg, 1985; Dales, 1968).  
Figure 1 gives a brief overview on the major events and instances of implementation in the 
history of emissions trading. The vertical axis indicates the scope of application of a particular 
version of emissions trading. The dotted lines represent informal influences between instances 
of implementation, the solid lines represent formal legal relations.  
 
Figure 1: Outline of  Emissions Trading's Innovation Journey 
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A qualitative analysis of the dynamics in the innovation journey framework is presented in the 
following sections. I will use the adapted concepts from innovation studies which I introduced 
here, including poles and phases of the innovation journey, when they capture patterns and 
dynamics which I find in the case study. Providing additional insights by this way of looking 
at dynamics of governance I wish to show the added value of using these concepts.  
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3  Gestation and proof-of-principle: first developments in the shadow of com-
mand-and-control regulation at the U.S. Environmental Protection agency  
In contemporary policy debates emissions trading is treated, as if it was always around – an 
unhistorical generic form of governing the environment which recently happens to be chosen 
for implementation. Against this backdrop it is inspiring to look back at when emissions trad-
ing first appears in policy debates. The reconstruction of wider developments at that time ac-
tually reveals events and processes in which the instrument took shape. Interestingly, emis-
sions trading originated from two different strands of precursors, one in science and one in the 
practice of US clean air regulation. The scientific strand is the emerging concept of tradable 
rights to pollute. The practical strand is tinkering with flexible regulation by regulators at the 
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). These two strands brought up new options like 
theories, legal rules, legitimating narratives, routines, skills etc. that could be combined into a 
new type of policy instrument. First developments towards emissions trading as a new con-
figuration in environmental governance started in a protected space provided by legal intersti-
ces in the incumbent command-and-control regime, “regulatory reform” as a prominent item 
on the presidential agenda and a concentration of economics skills within one of EPA’s or-
ganisational units. A first emissions trading programme was cobbled together and grafted on 
existing regulation. With this a proof-of-principle became established for the working of 
emission markets, even if actual performance of the initial configuration remained behind 
expectations.  
Looking back, a scientific trajectory emerged throughout the 1960s and 1970s with new find-
ings in economic theory. With the conceptualisation of tradable permits as an alternative to 
command-and-control and taxes (Coase 1960) the establishment of emission markets became 
an option for controlling environmental pollution (Dales, 1968). A vigorous debate among 
economic theorists about pros and cons of permits vs. charges resulted in refined articulation 
of the concept, its representation in economic models and assemblage of arguments for its 
superiority over taxes including formal theoretical proof (Montgomery 1972). In an abstract 
and principled form new options for emissions regulation were invented in course of this de-
bate. 
Environmental governance, however, was only just about to become established, at that time. 
Regulatory practice became shaped in implementing facility oriented emission standards from 
the US Clean Air Act. In 1970 the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was set up 
and environmental regulation started to show effect, including upcoming opposition from 
targeted industries who put the infant regime under pressure, for example, by circulating the 
idiom of a “growth ban”. Attempting the balance between statutory provisions and interest 
groups EPA officials tinkered with “flexible regulation”. A first instance was the “bubble 
concept”, developed between 1972 and 1975, which allowed the breaching of standards for 
one particular facility, if it was compensated by emissions below the standards at another fa-
cility of the same company. The “offset mechanism” extended this concept to compensation 
across companies, one year later; so that a first limited market for emission rights became 
established. The offset mechanism was accommodated into the legal framework of the CAA 
in 1977 – officially not as a policy shift, but as pragmatic repair work within the existing 
command-and-control regime (Cook, 1988). It did represent an interstice within the regime, 
however. The opening was used by young entrepreneurial economists at EPA to set up a de-
velopment programme for market based environmental regulation, starting from the practice 
of flexible regulation and linking it with the theory of tradable permits.
9 A protected space 
 
6    
within EPA was provided by the Office of Planning and Evaluation (later Office of Planning 
and Management, OPM) as an institutional stronghold for economic concepts in regulation.
10 
The OPM came “to serve as an organizational home for reformers in the agency” (Cook, 
1988, 10).  
Within this protected space first developments for emissions trading as a new policy instru-
ment took place. In 1978 the new Carter Administration was intrigued by the promise of a 
policy instrument that could dissolve critique against over-boarding regulation and supported 
experiments with new economic techniques of regulation at EPA (Cook, 1988, 46).
 11 Within 
the laboratory created by the offset mechanism, OPM and White House support the emerging 
regulatory technique was shielded from immediate political contestation, it was developed in 
the shadow of broad public debates about political values and regulatory culture with re-
sources in form of economic knowledge and institutional authority provided by the OPM and 
broader linkages to the regulatory reform movement.
12 
From early on, the development of market based regulation was based on the promise of more 
efficient and less contentious regulation: markets would smoothly organise themselves with-
out much political intervention and minimise the resistance of business actors to environ-
mental protection measures. In 1977 emissions trading was not more than an abstract model 
of tradable permits, on the one hand, and highly contextual, improvised practices of flexible 
regulation, on the other hand. It was something which Rip and Schot in their conception of 
technological innovation call a “hopeful monstrosity (…): full of promise, but not able to per-
form very well” (2001: 162). In fact, the label emissions trading was not yet attached to this 
promise at the time. Nevertheless, the promise worked to mobilise resources. After 1978 the 
OPM “grafted economic incentives in an incremental and piecemeal fashion on an existing 
directive framework” (Marcus, 1980:171). The result was a programme initially called “con-
trolled regulation”. In 1979 “emission reduction credits” were introduced as a currency for 
emissions amounts below standards. Further support came from the Reagan Administration’s 
agenda for “regulatory relief” in 1980 (Cook, 1988:xi-xii, 1-2). In 1982 EPA presented a pro-
posal for an “Emissions Trading Policy Statement. General Principles for Creation, Banking, 
and Use of Emission Reduction Units”.  
Part of these early developments was an increasing articulation of promises and requirements. 
Tinkering gave way to more systematic and coordinated research and development. For busi-
ness actors to support the scheme it was necessary to assure liquidity of emission markets and 
avoid volatility of prices and related risks. This requirement shaped development efforts so 
that “banking” was introduced as a new design component to smooth price development. This 
further sophistication of the design of emission markets created promises for other actors like 
the finance industry who realised that trading and banking of emission certificates could be a 
future business field. Again, new requirements were added to assure that markets of emission 
certificates were compatible with the established financial market regime and its regulations 
and routines. The development agenda successively became more complex and more power-
ful in terms of the resources that were devoted to it. A promise-requirement cycle, as can be 
observed in processes of technological innovation, had kicked-in and boosted early develop-
ments of emissions trading in the protected space within CAA (van Lente, 1993; van Lente, 
Rip, 1998). Promise and requirement created momentum to overcome internal resistance to 
the innovation at EPA, for example by engineers and lawyers who had a central role for 
command-and-control regulation and feared devaluation of their competences (Cook, 1988:4). 
Early developments were interpreted as a “major crusade for regulatory reform in the EPA, 
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centered around the use of economic incentives” towards a transformation of regulatory prac-
tice according to a “culture of efficiency” (Cook, 1988, 62).  
The EPA programme as a result of these efforts was not a transferable governance technol-
ogy, but a laboratory creation which was built in a piecemeal fashion from existing elements 
of discourse, legislation and regulatory skills and practices and survived within the particular 
political space created by offset and OPM. Scenarios about its functioning in other govern-
ance contexts were diffuse or non-existent.  
Some first checks of compatibility with public opinion and legal frameworks, however, have 
taken place at this early stage. Elements of EPA‘s emissions trading program were repeatedly 
contested at the courts, mainly by environmental NGOs who found it ethically unacceptable 
to put pollution on sale. A key point was the legal framing of emission reduction credits. The 
term “property right” which was proposed by economic theorists had to be substituted by the 
term “allowance” in order to retain legal powers of the state viz-a-viz the holders of permits 
(Tietenberg ). Legal contestation and internal controversy at EPA delayed issuance of a final 
version of the Emissions Trading Policy Statement until December 1986.  
In 1985 a first evaluation study of EPA’s emissions trading program was published. The 
working of the configuration was assessed against the theory of tradable permit markets 
(Tietenberg, 1985). This pulled the nascent policy scheme out from the shadow of the com-
mand-and-control regime and highlighted it as a first instance of a new policy instrument in 
practice, a proof of the principle that emission reduction obligations could be traded. From the 
side of business, however, the new options for flexibility did not receive much attention. 
Banking and trading of emission credits was only sporadically used and did not result in any 
considerable cost reductions (Tietenberg, 1985). Most of these deficiencies were attributed to 
the fact that the theoretical design principles were not yet implemented systematically.  
4  Stepping out into the real world with a prototype: Project 88 and transfor-
mation of the U.S. clean air policy regime 
A second phase with major importance for the development of emissions trading sees the con-
figuration of the U.S. Acid Rain Program as a prototype that is actually designed and pre-
sented as a new form of governance in its own right. This emissions trading exemplar explic-
itly combined economic theory with regulatory experiences from the EPA programme. It was 
announced as a paradigmatic shift towards market based environmental governance, became 
trimmed in the rough currents of an extended legislative process and became implemented as 
a core part of U.S. environmental governance. The prototype induced many attempts at repro-
duction within and outside the U.S. Several of these attempts were successful in the U.S. and 
worked to transform clean air policy from a command-and-control to a market based regime. 
Leading up to the development and implementation of the prototype was a comprehensive 
process of alignment and agenda building within environmental policy networks, labelled 
Project 88. 
Normally, a radical innovation like emissions trading would be expected to find difficulties in 
acceptance. In the context of the EPA programme this was the case. The instrument had been 
kept to its niche, officially leaving the command-and-control regime intact. The wider world 
of environmental governance and political discourse in general, however, was undergoing 
some changes during the 1980s. 
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The problem of Acid Rain moved onto the political agenda, adding to the problem of health 
effects from local air pollution. The environmental movement gained broad support in soci-
ety. At the same time, international competition increased, financial deficits grew, and trust in 
government eroded. The Reagan Administration championed regulatory reform for a business 
friendly society. These parallel developments furthered social cleavages around the concep-
tual opposition of ecology and economy. During the 1980s, several unsuccessful legislative 
proposals were launched to extend the application of emission standards from new sources to 
include existing sources. Although they were all accompanied by flexibility and burden shar-
ing mechanisms, industrial and regional interests in the House, Senate and the Reagan Ad-
ministration blocked off any political measures against Acid Rain in the 1980s (Ellermann et 
al., 2000, 20). On a global level the commission on environment and development, chaired by 
Gro Harlem Brundtland, published its final report in 1987. It took the environment-economy 
impasse as its starting point and proclaimed sustainable development as a vision for which 
diverging societal goals were to be reconciled. 
It was against this background that emissions trading entered the next phase of its innovation 
journey. Around 1988, on the occasion of another presidential election in the USA, a broad 
range of political interests, notably from industry as well from the environmental movement, 
became enrolled in a concerted effort to feature emissions trading as a solution to reconcile 
environmental and economic interests and overcome the stalemate in Acid Rain Policy. In the 
wake of the election campaigns, a coalition of policy entrepreneurs initiated Project 88 as “a 
nonpartisan effort to find innovative solutions to major environmental and natural resource 
problems” (Project 88, 1988:ix).
13 With Project 88 emissions trading left its protected space 
and stepped out into the wider world of environmental politics. Insiders from the development 
network of the policy instrument became confronted with outsiders from the societal context 
on which the instrument would impact. These actors needed to be enrolled for successful im-
plementation of a prototype. In this regard, pioneering parts of the administration and other 
users, legal frameworks, existing policy instruments, interest groups, issues in public dis-
course became integrated as part of the configuration in order to make it work. Extensive con-
sultation with key figures from industry, environmental NGOs, government and academia 
produced a report entitled “Harnessing Market Forces to Protect the Environment”. The report 
paved the way for a broad political coalition by framing environmental policy as a question of 
technical design, independent of contending values and political positions: “Project 88 steps 
away from ongoing debates over specific environmental goals, to focus instead on finding 
better mechanisms for achieving whatever standards are set” (Project 88, 1988:ix). The “ re-
port looks at ways to engineer the forces of the marketplace into our environmental programs, 
using economic incentives (and disincentives) to make the everyday economic decisions of 
individuals, businesses, and the government work effectively for the environment” (Project 
88, 1988:2). “Project 88 bridges this gap [between environment and economy] by applying 
economic incentives to the work of environmental protection” (Project 88, 1988:9). By this 
way, Project 88 granted business some ownership of the instrument – indeed offering business 
opportunities in trading, banking and monitoring emission allowances – in order to “enlist the 
innovative capacity of American entrepreneurs in our environmental enterprise” (Project 88, 
1988:9). 
When the new Administration moved into office it started the implementation of a prototype. 
Project 88 was sent into a second round as to ensure embedding in the political context. The 
prototype followed the design of a cap-and-trade system which represented the state of the art 
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in economic theory. The proposed cap corresponded with the total sulphur dioxide emissions 
that would result, if emission standards from the 1970 CAA would be extended to all existing 
installations. With the help of emissions trading Bush could thus meet a long standing de-
mand by the environmental movement. Looking back in 1991, when introducing proposals to 
include emissions trading into the Clean Air Act, President Bush said: "Let me commend Pro-
ject 88 and groups like the Environmental Defense Fund for bringing creative solutions to 
long-standing problems, for not only breaking the mold, but helping to build a new one." 
(Project 88 - Round II, 1991:2). Final rules for emissions trading were adopted in January 
1993. By 1994 a market had developed.  
The other side of successfully stepping out into the wider world is that the messiness of reality 
breaks into the design. Whereas the first emissions trading program at EPA was deliberately 
built upon the institutional foundations of the command-and-control regime and only incre-
mentally introduced trading as a flexibility measure, the US Clean Air Act was meant to be an 
example of emissions trading as discussed in economic theory. The transferral of the instru-
ment from economics textbooks to political reality, however, brought several problems to the 
fore: In economic theory distributive effects were neglected, because in the world of market 
models they do not have an impact on the overall efficiency of the instrument. In the policy 
process they came to the fore and fed conflicts about alternative forms of allocating emissions 
reduction allowances and various other details of design (Ellermann et al., 2000, 27). The 
proposal by the administration also raised concern with respect to the feasibility and ethical 
acceptability of emissions trading – this time in larger circles than the few experts that had 
followed the development of the EPA mechanisms. In a complex constellation of involved 
parties with diverging interests and under high time pressure the neat theoretical concept of 
emissions trading had to be broken up and additional elements be introduced to repair it.
14 At 
the same time, however, such compromises and ad-hoc developments had to be rationalised in 
real-time in order to defend the project on the ground of the promise of efficiency in order to 
stabilise support for ongoing development work and secure acceptance by target groups and 
the wider public. In effect, as one of the later evaluators of the instrument has termed it, ”Title 
IV is built on more or less arbitrary emission limits, trading to reduce costs, and an allowance-
allocation scheme that is at lest as messy as most tax legislation and that has a history with no 
more nobility” (Ellermann et al., 2000, 316-317). 
Throughout the 1990s emissions trading became wide spread and accepted as an environ-
mental policy instrument in the United States. Several emissions trading schemes became 
established on a regional level in the United States and the concept of market based regulation 
gained dominance.
15 At the same time, there was continued resistance internationally and es-
pecially in Europe.
16 Regulatory culture, institutions, balance of power of interest groups etc. 
provided a less favourable selection environment in Europe. Scepticism about the promises of 
market models was deeply anchored. Such were ethical and political concerns about shifting 
responsibility for emission reduction away from polluters. Command-and-control based re-
gimes of environmental regulation were stronger in many European countries than in the US, 
with incumbent interests and institutional inertia making radical innovation more difficult 
(Woerdman, 2002b; Cass 2005). 
Six years after it started, the US Acid rain Program was evaluated as a great success with re-
spect to economic as well as ecological goals. One commentator emphasized that “(t)he ex-
planation must lie in departures from the textbook world of perfect rationality, perfect compe-
tition, and perfect certainty, in which the system always follows the long-run equilibrium path 
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– that is, in mistakes, market imperfections, and forecasting errors” (Ellermann et al., 2000, 
299).
17 Whether these additional factors were recognised or not, the prototype was recom-
mended for large scale application: “We believe that our analysis of the U.S. Acid Rain Pro-
gram supports a number of general lessons… The experience … clearly establishes that large-
scale tradable permits programs can work more or less as textbooks describe…” (Ellermann 
et al., 2000, 315).  
With the US Acid Rain Program as a working exemplar in place, however, “the concept of 
harnessing market forces to protect the environment has gone from being politically anathema 
to politically correct.“ (Stavins 2002, 1). At least in US environmental policy, “market-based 
instruments have moved center stage, and policy debates look very different from the time 
when these ideas were characterized as “licenses to pollute” or dismissed as completely im-
practical“ (Stavins 2002, 14). 
5  Regime formation: Kyoto, EU emissions trading, and the carbon industry 
Emissions trading’s innovation journey did not come to an end with becoming established the 
US environmental governance regime. It branched out into other governance regimes, found 
interstices to link up to and flourish. Emissions trading became linked to the Kyoto protocol 
of the nascent regime of international climate policy. From here on, it did not become further 
developed due to antagonistic positions of the USA and EU, but shot further branches into 
corporate governance regimes. BP and Shell implemented the first examples of trans-national 
greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes. These provided bridgeheads for the innovation to 
travel to European policy networks, surpassing the blockade on the level of international ne-
gotiations. The innovation was picked up and promoted by the OECD and by businesses who 
founded the International Emissions Trading Association as a means to promote emissions 
markets as a new business field for their services. Denmark and the UK started to develop 
national emissions trading schemes for greenhouse gases. Emission trading became a global 
policy hype which made it difficult to be against it. Scepticism in European policy develop-
ment circles reversed into the expectation that it would come anyway and one should be part 
of it. US withdrawal from international climate negotiations freed the European Union to pur-
sue emission trading on their own terms. The Commission orchestrated the development a 
European directive as framework for 25 interlinked emissions trading systems in the member 
states. With the implementation of the directive through connected national environmental 
policy networks in member states a regime formed around the instrument with specialised 
experts, professions, international organisations and emerging design paradigms and stan-
dards for development of the instrument. The policy regime takes on dynamics of its own. It 
is to stay and currently is expanding. 
With international climate negotiations an opportunity opened up for emissions trading to 
branch out from US clean air policy into other governance domains. US diplomats with sup-
port of the international business community pressed international emissions trading into the 
Kyoto Protocol – against resistance of the European Union who feared that reduction com-
mitments could be evaded by importing excess emissions rights (“hot air”) from former so-
cialist countries (Oberthür, Ott, 1999, 188-190; Damro, Luaces Méndez 2003, 76). The devel-
opment of a working rule system for international emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol 
finally stranded because the EU insisted to limit trading to 50% of required emission reduc-
tions (Woerdman, 2002a, 350-384; Cass 2005). This was not the only route, however, along 
which the innovation network branched out from US clean air policy. When international ne-
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gotiations reached stalemate EDF set up an initiative to encourage business corporations to 
move ahead with company internal trading schemes for carbon emission allowances as a 
means to demonstrate their support for the instrument and show that it is feasible for the ap-
plication to greenhouse gases. In 1998 BP indeed announced the introduction of such a 
scheme. Shell followed soon after (Zapfel, Vainio 2002, 8). The BP and Shell schemes at-
tracted attention as the first application of emissions trading to greenhouse gases and on a 
trans-national scale. These examples allowed the instrument to travel through conferences and 
workshops to Europe and around the world and link up with discourses of local policy and 
business circles (Christiansen, Wettestad 2003, 9). Towards the end of the 1990s also the 
OECD picked up tradable permits and emissions trading as a pet proposal for which it could 
provide review and dissemination services and manifest its role a as a neutral policy broker 
and testing agency  (OECD, 1997; OECD/IEA, 2004).
18 
Increasingly also actors beyond established environmental policy networks became enrolled 
in the innovation network. “(…) market intermediaries and other potential service providers 
(auditing companies, consultants, lawyers, academics, commercial conference organisers) saw 
a potential market arising and were more than willing to invest some resources under the 
header of business development.” (Zapfel, Vainio 2002, 7). Their “helper’s interest” 
(Prittwitz, 1990:116-121) brought forward exploratory studies and research & development 
activities  in Europe which were justified by the need to be prepared for upcoming policy de-
bates. Part of the dynamics in these years was the emergence of what is now called the carbon 
industry—an increasingly organised sector of specialised businesses that provide service for 
the development and maintenance of emissions markets. The International Emissions Trading 
Association (www.ieta.org) was set up in 1999 to promote the worldwide development of 
emissions markets. Its members are specialised consultancies, banks, brokers, exchanges, risk 
managers, project developers, journals, conference organisers, news services etc. Emissions 
trading gained additional momentum – not only as an environmental policy instrument, but 
also as a thriving service economy which started to actively advertise its products and lobby 
for the expansion of its market. 
In the context of these ongoing developments on a supra- and sub-national level policy initia-
tives started to take shape also on a national level in Europe. In 1999 Denmark introduced the 
first emissions trading scheme in Europe. While this case gained little attention—as CO2 trad-
ing was closely linked to liberalisation of electricity and restricted to eight big companies—
(Pedersen 2000, 3-5), a parallel initiative stirred up debate in policy cycles around Europe. In 
the UK business actors set up an Emissions Trading Group (ETG) to develop a voluntary 
scheme as an alternative to tax proposals. The ETG comprised multinational companies with 
experience from emissions trading in the US. Central actors from the US emission trading 
innovation network participated regularly in working group sessions (Smith 2004, 83-84). 
With the ETG a European bridgehead of the emissions trading innovation network became 
established. The benefit for the UK of a head start on global carbon markets was a key argu-
ment in advertising the initiative to government and societal stakeholders. In 2002 the UK 
government endorsed and financially supported a pilot scheme developed by the ETG on the 
ground of “to enable business to gain practical experience of emissions trading ahead of a 
European and international system, and to help the City of London establish itself as a global 
centre for emissions trading.”
19 
Because of such investments and activities, the expectation of something new and big coming 
up in environmental policy was rising. A global hype started around emissions trading as the 
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policy instrument of the future. There was “a conference on emissions trading somewhere in 
the world every day, each accompanied by a raft of papers from universities, think tanks, and 
government agencies. In less than a decade, emissions trading has gone from being a pariah 
among policymakers to being a star – everybody’s favourite way to deal with pollution prob-
lems” (Ellermann et al., 2000: 4). Europe was still rejecting emissions trading under the 
Kyoto Protocol, but European policy development networks were part of the hype. More and 
more believed that emissions trading would come, anyway, and that it would only be sensible 
to get involved—and the more believed in it the more likely it became that his would happen. 
This made it difficult to be against emissions trading. Around 2000 a reversal happened. Aca-
demics, analysts, consultants, environmental interest groups and others who were critical of 
emissions trading, turned into supporters, the debate shifted from the question of “if” to 
“how” (Zapfel, Vainio 2002:9-10). The hype enrolled important centres of policy develop-
ment in Europe to the emissions trading innovation network. US experts frequently travelled 
to Europe for lecturing and consulting. Reports, technical terms, design principles, metaphors 
etc. started to circulate across the Atlantic (Zapfel, Vainio 2002, 7-8). 
The European Commission became a hub of informal consultations and exploration of emis-
sions trading as a policy instrument for domestic climate policy. The Commission hired US 
experts and started to take on the role of a policy entrepreneur for emissions trading within the 
European Union while keeping up resistance against international emissions trading under the 
Kyoto Protocol (Wettestad 2005, 16).
20 In 2000 the Commission tabled a Green Paper with a 
proposal for a European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) and set up a stakeholder forum 
to develop it.
21 When the USA withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 the next critical 
juncture arose. Emissions trading was freed of the delegitimising association with the US at-
tempting to undermine reduction commitments and the EU was urged to take over the lead 
and demonstrate concrete successes in climate policy in order to keep the international proc-
ess alive (Wettestad 2005, 16).
22 In 2001 the Commission tabled a draft Directive to establish 
the EU-ETS. The proposal acknowledged the diversity of political and technical circum-
stances on the level of member states by providing a mere framework to be filled by National 
Allocation Plans (NAP) which should specify concrete designs. The framework contained a 
common infrastructure for European emission markets, including the “Community Independ-
ent Transaction Log” (CITL) for registering and tracking allowances and it provided stan-
dards to ensure compatibility of the national systems with one another and with other Euro-
pean policies such as the 1996 Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive 
and the liberalisation of energy markets. In an “ultra-quick process” the Directive became 
adopted in 2003 for the EU-ETS to commence in 2005 (Wettestad 2005).  
With the requirement for 25 member states of the EU to adopt a NAP and develop their own 
domestic application of the EU-ETS framework the innovation network immensely broad-
ened. Local expert communities and auxiliary service providers formed within national envi-
ronmental policy networks in Europe and gave the emission trading configuration—and the 
“carbon industry”—as it had developed in the centres of European policy-making a firm 
grounding in national environmental governance regimes.  
In the course of domesticating emissions trading within national policy contexts a tension 
became apparent between the need of standardised design for compatibility of emission mar-
kets and particular social, technical, environmental and—above all—political conditions in 
the respective settings of implementation. Powerful political interests, policy legacies, legal 
frameworks, specific industry structure required repair work and partial re-innovation to ar-
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rive at configurations that could work embedded in peculiar contexts of use.
23 Ongoing con-
flicts between the European Commission and member states over the acceptability of various 
special shapes give ample evidence of these difficulties, but also shows that approval of NAPs 
by the Commission—as one of the elements of the EU-ETS framework design—establishes 
an effective mechanism for the standardisation of policy technology. 
From 2005 on the EU-ETS established a European market of allowances for 2.2 billion tons 
of carbon emissions from 11,500 installations. In 2006 the daily transaction volume in emis-
sion allowances has reached 60 million Euro. Linked to this was a fundamental transforma-
tion of basic structures of environmental governance regimes. Tradable permits and certifi-
cates of all kinds have become state of the art in environmental regulation, hardly any prob-
lem to which they are not applied even in an exploratory manner. Linked to this shift are a 
stronger role for economic expertise and a reframing of the pollution problem from moral 
condemnation to efficient allocation. Attached to the new paradigm in policy development is 
a social infrastructure of specialised skills, professional careers, organisations and, in the case 
of emissions trading, the peculiar phenomenon of the carbon industry as a whole new service 
economy which prospers around emission allowances as an artificially created commodity. 
One can speak of a new policy regime that has developed around emission trading as a par-
ticular technology in environmental governance. Various parts of the working configuration 
plus elements of the multi-level infrastructure of policy development and carbon industry rely 
upon and mutually reinforce each other. This regime holds emissions trading in place—and it 
creates additional momentum. Even if, over the coming years, some of the great promises of 
efficiency and effectiveness would become deconstructed in scientific and political debate 
(for example, by highlighting transaction costs and hidden costs of regulation or unavoidable 
distortion of textbook design by implementation in the context of real world politics), there is 
a good chance, that the instrument will be retained, expanded and branching out into other 
governance domains. There is already evidence of developments to include air traffic into the 
EU-ETS and of establishing links between European climate policy as the new centre of the 
innovation network with regional initiatives for greenhouse gas emission trading in the USA 
and in other countries like Japan and Canada. A vision that guides these stabilising interac-
tions between policy development networks is a global emission market of interlinked mutu-
ally compatible trading systems. 
6  Technological regimes in governance 
The case study of emissions trading reveals an interesting element in the dynamics of policy 
development which is worth to be discussed for itself. This is the formation of a regime 
around emissions trading as a policy instrument. What I intend to highlight is the quality of 
this regime as a technological regime in the realm of governance.
24 It represents a particular 
social structure that is arranged around and geared towards a particular means of policy, a 
technique of governance. This contrasts with established regime concepts in policy studies 
which are arranged around and geared towards particular problems and goals.
25 Technological 
regimes thus introduce cross-cutting patterns to the analysis of governance structures in spe-
cific problem domains (e.g. German energy policy, European competition policy, global cli-
mate policy). Their own momentum and trajectories constitute a lateral dynamic with implica-
tions for governance change. 
The innovation journey of emissions trading is a clear example for the incremental build-up 
and solidification of expertise and organisational patterns which are specialised for develop-
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ing and operating this particular policy instrument. Increasing sophistication and complexity 
of the configuration (to make it work in real world contexts) play an important role for the 
growth and differentiation of a community of experts for this particular technology. An im-
portant difference to other policy instruments is the additional creation of new economy as a 
central component of the working configuration– with all features of a general business sec-
tor, including market intermediaries, institutional infrastructures and organisation for political 
lobbying. The “carbon industry” associated with the establishment of markets for greenhouse 
gas emissions is an example in case. 
The structuration and stabilisation of social patterns in instrument related interactions (includ-
ing the emergence of specialised organisations) is important to note. It demarcates a deviation 
from understandings of policy instruments as ideas or purely cognitive constructs (Howlett, 
Ramesh 1993; Rose, 1993; Dolowitz, Marsh 1996).
26 With a view on regimes as an emerging 
social structure it becomes apparent how policy instruments develop a life of their own. A 
self-reinforcing momentum is generated by the dependence of regime actors’ existence and 
growth on further development and application of the instrument. The more sophisticated it 
becomes, the larger the scope to which it applies, the more governance domains it enters the 
larger is the market for specialised expertise and services. From within the regime the policy 
instrument becomes seen as an end in itself, prior to the actual performance with respect envi-
ronmental policy goals. In this direction policy instruments can be understood to influence 
and shape problem definitions and policy goals as much as they themselves are shaped by 
goal oriented policy design. This offers a view of governance change as co-evolution of pol-
icy technology with policy problems and institutional changes within particular governance 
domains.
27  
7  Conclusions 
The innovation perspective on policy development which I adopted for the case study on 
emission trading brought aspects to the fore which are commonly backgrounded in policy and 
governance studies that take policy problems a their entry point. The case has shown that the 
policy instrument actually has a life of its own. It has grown and evolved in interaction with 
ongoing context changes, most importantly in the governance domains where working con-
figurations were implemented. It also became apparent that policy instruments cannot ade-
quately be understood as purely cognitive concepts which are passively waiting to be picked 
up and become enacted. An historical dynamic perspective on emission trading shows that the 
instrument took shape in course of an extended innovation journey with twists and turns. De-
sign, legitimacy and attributed performance characteristics changed as the process was driven 
and shaped by the distributed agency of many actors, the formation of networks and estab-
lishment of linkages with various contexts of implementation. And it showed how technologi-
cal regimes insert self-reinforcing trajectories to the development of policy instruments. This 
introduces a lateral dynamic to governance change which is partly independent of problems 
and goals. 
These additional considerations are possible because of the use of the perspective of the inno-
vation journey. Emissions trading turned out to be a clear-cut case, ideal to demonstrate the 
added value of the perspective. In other cases it may not always possible to reconstruct the 
innovation journey with the conceptual elements at hand. Some hypothetical generalisations 
may be drawn for other economic instruments, especially those that are based on expert 
knowledge of sophisticated theoretical constructs and that give rise to new markets for advice 
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and services. For deeper and more valid insights into the dynamics of innovation in govern-
ance, however, more case studies are needed for different kinds of policy instruments. This 
will yield additional insights from comparison and the elaboration of different types of inno-
vation journeys. 
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9  Endnotes
                                                 
1   With reference to John Kingdon’s well known model of the policy process consisting of three interact-
ing streams (2003/1995:116-144), one could understand the study of emerging policy instruments as an investi-
gation into the “policy” stream which complements the analysis of agenda setting in the “problem” stream and of 
struggle for power in institutions of the political system in the “politics” stream. 
2   Arie Rip was also involved in the transfer of the concept to the realm of governance. I am indebted to 
him for important conceptual discussions and for specific comments on drafts of this paper. His contributions go 
well beyond what can be represented in formal citations.  
3   The notion of success in the relation to innovations is here used for widespread introduction and estab-
lishment of a novel configuration in governance. It does not imply an evaluation of its success in achieving pro-
claimed goals and purposes or broader societal impacts. 
4   This is a very broad notion which is applied in generic studies of generation and maintenance of social 
order (Mayntz, Scharpf, 1995; Schneider, Kenis, 1996; Benz, 2004). Even there, however, material technologies 
are usually not considered part of the governance structure of a societal domain (for this see Rip 2006). The 
dominant use in political science is as a term to contrast government. It carries a narrower sense then, denoting 
cooperative forms of governing through networks of private and public actors (Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes 1996; 
Stoker 1998; Héritier, 2002).  
5   Note that this understanding of policy includes strategies and actions by citizens, social movements, 
companies, associations, research institutes, media, and not only by public policy actors who are officially in 
charge for maintenance and development of society’s governance.  
6   The boundaries between innovation and change, so defined, are analytical and cannot be empirically 
defined. In any kind of change enters some kind of intended action (Black, 2005). 
7   In this they refer to Michel Callon’s “techno-economic network” mapping approach (Callon, 1992). 
8    The traditional approach of command-and-control regulation is to regulate emissions by individual 
installations, either by fixing emission limits or specifying technological standards. 
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9   Linked to this entrepreneurial spirit are “career aspirations of new staff members” who “cast about for 
new initiatives which they could hook their stars to and use to separate themselves from the crowd“ (Meidinger 
1985:462-463). 
10   It was created as early as 1971 upon pressure from the Commerce secretary and was staffed by econo-
mists. 
11   Douglas Costle and William Drayton, two central figures of the innovation network, were appointed 
EPA director and deputy with responsibility for the OPM. Both had developed the “Connecticut Plan” for eco-
nomic law enforcement based on the introduction of economic incentives into regulation (Cook, 1988, 69). Wil-
liam Drayton was directly responsible for the offset program and given additional staff of economist and policy 
analysts to pursue regulatory reform within the agency (Cook, 1988, 50).  
12   “The political (and statutory) breathing room the Carter people needed came in the form of the growth-
ban crisis and its administrative remedy, the offset policy” (Cook, 1988: 70). “The offset policy provided a win-
dow of opportunity, albeit initially a narrowly opened one, allowing EPA reformers room to manoeuvre in ex-
ploring alternative control strategies with at least the semblance of incentive characteristics.” (Cook, 1988, 46). 
13   Project 88 was formally a study. In effect it was a focussed strategy of coalition building. Key actors 
behind Project 88 were two senators who sponsored the project (Timothy E. Wirth, Colorado, and John Heinz, 
Pennsylvania), economist Robert Stavins, professor for public policy at Harvard and former official at the Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund (EDF) who managed it, and a group of economic advisors around presidential candi-
date George H.W. Bush who promoted market based environmental policy instruments: „EDF was a major par-
ticipant in the Project 88 effort and worked closely with White House staff to develop the administration's Clean 
Air Act proposal (…). In particular, Environmental Defense Fund economist Daniel Dudek cooperated with key 
personnel at the Council of Economic Advisers and the Office of the President's Counsel.“ (Hahn, Stavins 
1991:24). 
14   Allocation was based on grandfathering, i.e. the distribution of allowances corresponding to past emis-
sions (1985-87 average), rather than on the free auctioning of allowances to incumbents and newcomers alike. 
More important were further exemptions for plants that used flue-gas desulphurization (scrubbers) instead of 
abandoning the use of high-sulphur coal from eastern states. These plants received generous bonus allowances. 
Together with provisions for aiding displaced workers in high-sulphur coal mining states these exemptions had 
to be included for consent by the affected states and their industries. 
15   In 1994 EPA required states to establish market based systems of regulation in order to achieve national 
air quality standards. A prominent example is the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) for the 
regulation of NOx and SO2 in the Los Angeles area (Harrison, 1999). RECLAIM was developed in parallel with 
the US Acid Rain program from 1990 to 1993. It went into operation in 1994. Other examples which gained 
some international visibility are the NOx Budget program which was set up in 1999 and comprises nine states in 
the Northeast of the United States, and the Illinois VOC trading scheme established in 1999 for the Chicago area. 
16   Also in Europe the prototype induced some activity in exploration and development of emissions trad-
ing for regulating air pollution. A proposal for SO2 emission regulation in the United Kingdom failed to gain 
support in the legislative process (Sorrell, 1999). A proposal by the business community in Norway was fed into 
discussion but was not taken up as a formal policy proposal (Hoibye, 1999). 
17   Unintended effects helped to boost the instrument: Economic models for certificate price forecast did 
not account of context factors like structural change in transport market. It turned out that low-sulphur coal was 
much more widely available, because of an unanticipated reduction of transport costs. The latter was a result of 
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the liberalisation of the railroads in the 1980s, surging competition and a considerable drop in rail rates. This 
meant that low sulphur coal became an economic alternative to the installation scrubbers in order to meet limited 
emission allowances for many more plants as initially expected (Ellermann et al., 2000, 104-105). 
18   Cf. the role of testing agencies in technology development (Garud, Karnoe 2002). 
19   Press release by Defra, 12 May 2003: COMMENTARY ON PRELIMINARY 1ST YEAR RESULTS 
AND 2002 TRANSACTION LOG. Elsewhere it was acknowledged that “the City of London is being estab-
lished as a centre for emissions trading, ahead of other locations such as Chicago, Frankfurt, Paris and Sydney. 
Emissions brokers are setting up operations in the UK, and there is considerable interest from overseas in using 
the UK scheme as a repository for holding international emissions allowances and credits. Although the UK 
emissions market will not be large in relation to other financial markets, the international emissions trading 
scheme is likely to be valued in multiple billions sterling, and will bring commensurate benefits to the City if 
trading activity is based here” (Defra: Regulatory and Environmental Impact Assessment of UK ETS) 
20   (Cass 2005) explains this divergence by “norm-entrapment” resulting from earlier strategies of delegit-
mising emissions trading as an attempt of the USA to evade emission reduction commitments. An important 
difference for the ecological effectiveness of the instrument is that internationally “hot air” (excess emission 
rights for former socialist countries due to deindustrialisation) was a considerable problem which did not apply 
to a EU wide trading scheme. 
21   “Astonishingly, the group – bringing together diverse interests with about 30 representatives from some 
Member States, industry, and environmental pressure groups – achieved a high degree of consensus and failed 
only to adopt a consensual recommendation in very few issues” (Zapfel, Vainio 2002, 11). 
22   Additional factors that made the Commission a key policy entrepreneur for emissions trading were the 
wish to avoid the uncoordinated development of incompatible systems on a national level and stranding of a 
community energy tax as centre piece of EU climate policy (The tax had required unanimity in the Council. 
Emissions trading only required a majority vote) (Christiansen, Wettestad 2003:6-7). 
23   Some uncontrolled complexification resulted from this, partly undermining the very principle of emis-
sion trading. In Germany, for example, allowances had to be distributed on the basis of historical emission (in-
stead of being auctioned) in order to find acceptance by affected industries. In order to avoid discrimination of 
new market entrants, however, a special rule system has to be introduced for the equipment of new installations 
with emission allowances and another for the transfer of allowances in the case of a substitution of an old instal-
lation with a new one. Here, again, it was necessary to introduce specified benchmarks for different technologies 
and a guarantee of allowed emissions for 14 years in order to avoid resistance from big industrial players. This 
requires provisions to rule out “shadow-plants” which are officially kept in operation for the allowances that 
effectively are transferred to other plants or sold on the market. 
24   This is in analogy to the concept of technological regime in the realm of commodity production or ser-
vice provision where it denotes a self-stabilising conglomerate of actors, ideas, institutions and artefacts around 
specific ways of doing things (Nelson, Winter, 1982; Rip, Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2002). 
25   Compare concepts of “international regime” (Krasner 1983), “regulatory regime” (Black, 2005). Also 
concepts such as “policy paradigms” (Hall 1993), “epistemic communities” (Haas 1992) or “advocacy coali-
tions” (Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith, 1993) hinge on policy problems, rather than particular solutions.  
26   It also complements Kingdon’s account of the policy stream as an eternally boiling “primeval soup” by 
introducing dynamics of coagulation. 
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27   This view links up with and indeed provides some specification of Kingdon’s multiple stream model of 
the policy process (Kingdon, 2003/1995). 
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